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Abstract 
The debate on volunteering has paid insufficient attention to the relationship between public 
spending and volunteering. Recently, the importance of this relationship was highlighted by 
the current British government’s “Big Society” plan, which asserts that withdrawing public 
agencies and spending will be compensated by an increase in volunteering. This idea is based 
on the widely held belief that a high degree of government intervention decreases voluntary 
activities. This paper uses a multidisciplinary approach to develop a more refined 
understanding of how public spending affects the decision to volunteer. A theoretical model 
conceptualizes this relationship in terms of time donation by employed individuals. The 
model is empirically developed through an econometric analysis of two survey data sets and 
interpretative analysis of narratives of local volunteers and public professionals. The results 
suggest that volunteering is likely to decline when government intervention is decreased and 
recommend a collaborative approach to sustaining volunteering. 
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During the 2010 British elections, the debate did not evolve around the financial crisis, public 
expenditure, and the necessity of severe cutbacks per se, but more fundamentally reflected 
diverging ideologies about the relationship between state and society for delivering public 
services (Smith 2010). While the Labour Party sought to continue increasing public spending 
and taxation, the Conservative Party proposed a radical turn to a small government and a 
“Big Society”. Eventually, the Conservatives formed a coalition government with the 
Liberal-Democrats and launched their plan for the Big Society. The main idea is that “rolling 
back big government” will lead “communities” to start running public services (Cabinet 
Office 2010). The idea that voluntary activity should, can, and will emerge as a perfect 
substitute for the welfare state has reinvigorated debate on the relationship between 
government and society, or, more specifically, between public spending and volunteering. 
 Ever since the launch of the Big Society in May 2010, commentators have vilified the 
plan for the dominance of rhetorical power over practical feasibility. The plan proposed to 
bring about “a new era of people power” through policy measures such as providing 
volunteering training to local citizens, especially young people, giving financial support to 
mutuals, co-operatives, charities and social enterprises to take over and run public services, 
and giving a general power of competence to local councils (Cabinet Office 2010). Concerns 
about its practical feasibility increased when Liverpool Council withdrew as one of the four 
pilot projects (BBC 2011a). Criticism grew that the coalition government was only meeting 
its affectionate rhetoric with lukewarm initiatives and little concrete promises (Alcock 2010), 
and, moreover, used the Big Society as a symbolic device to legitimize excessive cuts on 
public services and voluntary sector funding, consequently destroying the basic texture of 
voluntary programs and activities (BBC 2011b). 
The crucial issue at stake here is whether less public spending indeed leads more 
people into volunteering: does voluntary work automatically emerge as a perfect substitute 
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for government activity? Whether the Big Society is successful hinges on the occurrence of a 
strong crowding out effect to counter the cuts in public spending: i.e., an increase (decrease) 
in public expenditure brings about a significant decrease (increase) in citizens’ propensity to 
volunteer. Academic and policy debates are divided between the conventional beliefs that the 
relationship between government expenditure and volunteering is either a matter of crowding 
out or crowding in. But there is surprisingly little theoretical and empirical support for either 
position. This paper aims to fill that gap.  
This paper contributes in two important ways to recent debate in this journal about 
volunteering policy (Nesbit and Brudney 2010; Reinglod and Lenkowsky 2010) and 
voluntary organizations (Smith 2008; LeRoux 2009; Shea 2010) in the United States. First, 
focusing on the British situation draws attention to the crucial, yet under-studied, relationship 
between public spending and volunteering. A review of the relevant literature shows that 
concentrating on employed individuals can especially lead to new insights for volunteering 
policy, because this pivotal target group has to make a decision between allocating their time 
to working in the market or in volunteering. 
Second, the paper uses a multidisciplinary approach to refine theoretical and empirical 
understandings of the relationship between public spending and volunteering on the macro 
and micro level. The analysis integrates (1) an analytical model that conceptualizes the 
relationship between public spending, the individual decision to volunteer, individual 
abilities, and volunteering infrastructure; (2) an econometric analysis of four cross-country 
European datasets and British panel data showing that the decision of employed individuals 
to volunteer depends positively on government expenditure; and (3) a narrative analysis of 
qualitative interviews revealing how collaborative working is crucial to make citizens feel 
that volunteering is worth their time. 
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The analysis concludes that less public spending reduces the likelihood of (successful) 
volunteering. Lower public spending increases the probability of setbacks and frustrations for 
volunteers and decreases the availability of adequate support structures and professional 
skills. This leads to three conclusions and recommendations: (1) public spending is needed to 
prevent volunteering levels to drop, (2) employed individuals do voluntary work if they see it 
as worth their time, and (3) for public spending to increase volunteering, governments and 
voluntary organizations should cultivate local abilities and volunteering infrastructure based 
on collaborative relationships. 
 
Public Spending and Volunteering by Employed Individuals 
 
The literature provides important insights about the determinants of voluntary work for the 
total population or specific segments. Studies focusing on the total population showed that 
people can decide to volunteer, or give money to charity, because of pure altruism or warm-
glow altruism (Andreoni 1990), a desire to personally “make a difference” (Duncan 2004), 
impatience to receive a certain good (Bilodeau and Slivinski 1996), social pressure (Della 
Vigna et al. 2011), obliging social norms (Olken and Singhal 2009), or because giving can 
enhance their wellbeing (Meier and Stutzer 2008). The decision to volunteer can also be 
influenced by the socioeconomic or ethnic composition of the neighborhood or community 
(Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Atkinson and Kintrea 2001; Goodlad and Meegan 2005). 
However, the decision to volunteer might depend more strongly on macro-economical 
factors than on individual, social, or geographical characteristics (Hastings 2003; Amin 2005; 
Atkinson et al. 2005; New Economics Foundation 2010). An important stream of research 
explores how a change in the size of the welfare state influences the decision to volunteer 
(e.g., Khanna and Sandler 2000; Van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Hackl et al. 2012). These 
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studies focus either on the entire population or specific age groups (young people and retired 
people).  
At an aggregate population level, Hackl et al. (2012) find evidence for a crowding out 
effect due to an increase of the welfare state, while Van Oorschot and Arts (2005) do not. 
Menchick and Weisbrod (1987) showed that tax rates influence the opportunity costs of 
volunteering. Khanna and Sandler (2000) detected a crowding in effect in a study regarding 
money donations in the UK.   
For specific age groups, firm evidence exists that citizens tend to start volunteering 
later in life, mainly after retirement (Mutchler et al. 2003). In fact, old age is a key 
characteristic of “the usual suspects” who dominate volunteering (Barnes et al. 2007). At the 
same time, the voluntary work of young citizens was found to enhance their human capital 
and prospects of a higher income (Day and Devlin 1998). 
But perhaps the most crucial type of citizen is the employed individual who has to 
allocate time between working in the market and volunteering. Government expenditure and 
taxation influence employed agents’ decisions about their time allocation. By considering 
volunteering as work, unpaid labor, or productive activity (Musick and Wilson 2007, 111-
112), like any other type of work, it consumes resources, produces services to people, and 
requires certain abilities. The time employed individuals have at their disposal is scarce and 
their decision on what type of work to spend it on depends on their perception of whether that 
work is worth their time. Public spending affects this perception, because, in an impure 
altruism framework, individuals receive utility from the total amount of volunteering in 
society as well as from the result of their personal volunteering (Andreoni 2006). 
Whether an employed agent will be willing and able to allocate time to volunteering 
also depends on their abilities. Citizens with more skills and experience are more prone to 
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volunteer and are more effective in it. A key problem of voluntary work is getting other 
people than just “the usual suspects” to participate (Barnes et al., 2007; Taylor et al. 2011). 
This effect can be mediated by the presence of a volunteering infrastructure that 
enables recruiting, training, facilitating, and sustaining volunteers (Osborne et al. 2002; 
Nesbitt and Brudney 2010, S110-S111). Volunteering infrastructure does not only refer to the 
structures and procedures of voluntary sector organizations, but can also take the form of a 
school built, handbooks with practical knowledge and know-how, or the practices of public 
professionals who manage volunteering programs. It can embody physical capital (materials 
that facilitate production), human capital (skills and capabilities of individual persons), and 
social capital (structure of the relationships between actors) (Coleman 1988, S98, S100) used 
in the production of the public good. 
In conclusion, the literature has identified many factors that affect the willingness of 
citizens to volunteer, but the influence of government expenditure on employed individuals 
has been insufficiently explored. However, this relationship is fundamental to the widely held 
belief that public expenditure impairs volunteering. This paper explores this issue in greater 
theoretical and empirical detail based on a multidisciplinary approach that combines 
analytical modeling, econometric analysis, and narrative analysis. This approach enables, on 
the one hand, to conceptually grasp and empirically test the individual decision to volunteer 
in response to public spending as a complex macro-economical phenomenon in terms of 
general causal patterns, and, on the other, to interpret it as an intricate social phenomenon 
through qualitative analysis of micro-level practices. Despite epistemological differences 
between these methods, there is widespread support for multidisciplinary research that uses 
positivist methods to identify broad causal patterns on the macro-level and interpretivist 
methods to explain these in detail on the micro-level (Lin 1998; Seale 1999; Della Porta and 
Keating 2008). 
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An Economic Model of Public Spending and Volunteering 
 
Despite its ideological stance, the Big Society plan is coupled with hardwired economic 
considerations. Therefore it is useful to explicitly make a brief economic analysis by means 
of a theoretical model, admittedly simple but hopefully not too simplistic, to generate a set of 
predictions about the relationship between public spending and volunteering. This model 
takes an extremely optimistic view of the government’s economic achievements, by 
analyzing the Big Society in a pure situation of balanced budget, full employment, and 
perfectly rational individuals. By using these classical assumptions, the model deliberately 
avoids making an “easy” criticism of the current British government’s policies based on more 
or less Keynesian considerations about the recessionary effects of austerity measures. 
Similarly, in this ideal laboratory economy, it is assumed that government debt does not exist 
any longer, thereby ruling out any potentially misleading effects of past policy mistakes or 
global financial troubles. 
This section sketches the main aspects of the theoretical model (which the interested 
reader can find in the Appendix) and its main predictions. Since the focus is on volunteering 
and public expenditure, the model uses both an individual perspective (micro) and a country 
perspective (macro): the tool of general equilibrium helps to handle such a framework. Since 
macro variables evolve over time, also dynamic aspects (physical and social capital 
accumulation and depletion) are incorporated in this model. Volunteering infrastructure 
enters the model as a stock of volunteering experience inherited from previous generations. In 
fact, it seems realistic to acknowledge that past voluntary activities leave a positive trace in 
the community. The analytical model stylizes the factors influencing time allocation between 
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working and volunteering and determines their relationship with public policy at the 
macroeconomic level. Four main modeling steps are undertaken, which are summarized here. 
The first step is making a number of simplifying assumptions about the economy, 
some standard and some more innovative. Most notably, the model builds on a utility 
function which represents the interests of individuals about volunteering and working, and 
defines what makes them more or less happy. The utility function satisfies the following 
assumptions: individuals 1) like consuming market goods and leaving some wealth to their 
children; 2) care for doing some volunteering to help the community; 3) enjoy having some 
public good provided by taxes and by volunteering; and 4) suffer the hardships of working, 
whether it is for free or for a market salary. Assumptions 2) and 4) put together imply that 
while individuals dislike to some degree both kinds of labor efforts, they suffer volunteering 
less, due to the additional gratification aspect involved in that activity. 
Second, the utility of individuals, assumed heterogeneous in terms of abilities, is 
maximized subject to the constraints that derive from the market and the government’s 
policy. Moreover, both volunteering and market production require individual abilities and 
hours of work. Finally, the government manages to run a balanced budget, which guarantees 
that government spending cuts translate automatically into lower income tax rates. Of course, 
it is realized that this is a very optimistic and long-term perspective, assuming a 
governmental policy consistently pursued for a generation.  
Third, the results of all the individual units’ maximizations are aggregated by the 
perfectly competitive markets, in general equilibrium, so that (along with other important 
variables) the optimal amount of hours spent working for the market and volunteering are 
determined as a function of governmental policies.  
Figure 1 shows a graphic representation of the model:  
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[Figure 1 here] 
 
As a result, the first proposition can be mathematically derived, containing the first 
result of the model: a decrease in the tax rate causes a decrease in the optimal volunteering 
hours, and vice versa.  
A second proposition is obtained stating that an increase in taxation increases the 
voluntary and the public expenditure components of the public good, provided tax rates are 
not too high. That is, a Laffer-curve pattern arises, as shown in figure 2. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Finally, considering the subgroup of inactive agents shows that, in equilibrium, the 
third proposition is that they are indifferent to taxes and therefore might not be affected by 
the public expenditure. This clarifies the importance of empirically studying the employed 
fraction of the population. 
 
Econometric Analysis 
 
Two datasets were used to test the main predicted relationship between government 
expenditure and volunteering for employed individuals suggested by the theoretical analysis. 
The first dataset is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which contains unbalanced 
panel data about UK citizens from 1991 to 2007 [1]. As the focus is on employed individuals 
only, agents older than 60 or non-employed are eliminated from the sample. Nevertheless, the 
dataset is substantial: 45,376 observations from 12,378 different individuals. In this way, time 
and individual elements become central in the analysis. The data have been collected through 
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face-to-face interviews, or telephone interviews if impossible otherwise (Taylor et al. 2010). 
Data about UK government expenditure were extracted from the OECD UK statistical 
profile, and were divided, for each year, by the GDP. The constructed dataset contains also 
information about English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish government expenditure, 
obtained from PESA documents (Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses – HM Treasury) for 
each available issue (1999-2009), which also contained information for the time period 1991-
2008. Statistics from PESA are not necessarily fully consistent for different years, but their 
introduction in the analysis was used to check the robustness for general UK government 
expenditure.   
The second dataset contains data about OECD countries and countries included in the 
European Values Survey Wave 1 (1981), 2 (1990), 3 (1999), and 4 (2008). For Wave 1, 6,070 
valid observations from 11 countries were studied; for Wave 2, 10,568 valid observations 
from 22 countries; for Wave 3, 4,026 valid observations from 11 countries; and for Wave 4, 
6,492 valid observations from 19 countries. Data were collected by several data collectors for 
different countries. Face-to-face interviews with standardized questionnaires were conducted 
in the official language of each country, with the exception of 25% of interviews in Iceland in 
Wave 3 made by telephone (EVS 2011). 
For Wave 3 and 4 data about general government expenditure were extracted from the 
OECD statistics and divided, for each country and each year, by the GDP. For Wave 1 and 2, 
it was not possible to obtain data about the general government expenditure, but general 
government final consumption was used as proxy. General government final consumption, 
measured as percentage of the GDP, was extracted from the World Bank dataset, and 
includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services, but 
excludes the government capital formation. In the next subsection variables, analysis, and 
results are presented for both datasets [2].   
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Volunteering and Government in UK 
 
This subsection examines the effect of general government expenditure on the binary variable 
probability of volunteering, measured as being active in organizations [3]. The goal is to 
examine how expansions or contractions of UK and country-specific (England, Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland) general governments’ expenditure as a fraction of GDP are 
correlated with changes in the probability of each individual to volunteer. The empirical 
analysis controls for several other regressors: number of children, sex, level of education, 
marital status, income, liking the neighborhood, religion, and country. Using the personal and 
country-specific variables along with the government spending helps to make sure that the 
relationship between government expenditure and volunteering is robust. The description and 
coding of each variable is shown in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
A summary of the dependent variable and of each regressor is presented in Table 2. 
 
 [Table 2 here] 
 
The econometric analysis is developed on different levels to offer a comprehensive study. 
The first step is to perform an ordinary least square (OLS) regression for the entire dataset. 
Two sets of regressions are undertaken (of which the most relevant specification is reported): 
the first one (labeled OLS – Tot) uses UK government expenditure, while the second one 
(labeled OLS – Cou) uses, for each observation, the government expenditure of the countries 
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in which the respondent lives. The second analysis also controls for the countries, to make 
sure that the country government expenditure does not pick up some country-specific effects 
on volunteering. Table 3 presents the results: 
     
 [Table 3 here] 
 
 
Strikingly, government expenditure, no matter if UK-wide or country-specific, always 
has a positive and significant effect on volunteering. Also some personal characteristics 
appear to systematically matter for the individual decision to volunteer: education, belonging 
to any religious denomination, liking the neighborhood, having children, being married, 
being male, and having an interest in politics, all have positive effects. Having a higher 
income reduces the probability of volunteering, which suggests the possibility of a 
substitution effect between working and volunteering. 
Since the dataset is a panel and volunteering is measured as a binary variable, an OLS 
regression alone would not be sufficient. In the panel data analysis with fixed effects, all the 
variables which had no within variation, such as sex and religion, had to be dropped. The 
results of the analysis for the UK general government expenditure (variable Exp) are 
presented in Table 4.      
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
To check the robustness of the results, a battery of estimators was used, including: 
panel data OLS with fixed effect (xtreg fe), panel data OLS with random effects (xtreg re), 
panel data OLS with autoregressive errors of order 1 and fixed effects (xtregar fe), panel data 
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OLS with autoregressive errors of order 1 and random effects (xtregar re), logit analysis 
(logit), probit analysis (probit), panel data logit pooled regression (xtlogit pooled), panel data 
logit with fixed effects (xtlogit fe), panel data logit pooled regression (xtlogit pooled), panel 
data logit with fixed effects (xtlogit re), and panel data probit with fixed effects (xtlogit re). 
According to the Hausman test, the fixed effect estimators perform better than those with 
random effects.     
In each regression the government expenditure appears to positively influence the 
probability of individual’s volunteering, with the coefficient parameter significant at the 5% 
level, with the only exception of the linear probability OLS estimator with autoregressive 
errors or order 1 and with the (likely inconsistent, as suggested by the Hausman test) random 
effects estimator. Personal characteristics (having children, higher education, being married, 
liking the neighborhood, and being interested in politics) all tend to encourage volunteering, 
while having a higher income tends to discourage volunteering, although these characteristics 
are not always significant. 
The same investigation is repeated by disaggregating the government expenditure of 
the four member-countries (Expcou), as shown in Table 5.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
The results are similar to the aggregate UK analysis: the country-specific government 
expenditure coefficients are positive and significant, except for the panel data OLS with 
autoregressive errors or order 1 and with the random effects. This shows that the government 
expenditure effect is robust for the division in countries and does not depend on external UK 
circumstances. Also the effects of personal characteristics are along the lines of the pattern 
observed in Table 4, thereby confirming the robustness of the previous results. 
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Volunteering and Government in Europe 
 
Could the positive effect of government expenditure on volunteering be a British anomaly? 
To answer this questions a second study is carried out on the countries that fall in the 
intersection between the EVS study and the OECD [4].  A full description of the country 
variables is not reported due to lack of space, and the focus will be on the most relevant 
estimates. 
Along with the general government expenditure variable (exp) and the general 
government final consumption variable (govcon), several variables are included in the 
regressions. Table 6 shows each variable, its definition and its coding.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
The first two waves show some differences compared to the third and fourth. Income 
is only available categorically (incomecat), according to the respondent’s position in the 
national deciles income ladder, no data is available about education (education), nor ideas 
about people sticking to their affairs (people). Also, for the first wave, no data are available 
about political interest (vote). 
Table 7 summarizes the dependent variable and each independent variable.  
      
[Table 7 here] 
 
The four waves are analyzed separately; in fact, the EVS is not a panel dataset, as 
individuals are not followed in time; and it is more correctly interpreted as cross sectional 
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rather than longitudinal dataset, because not every country is represented in all of the four 
datasets. Therefore, the dataset is considered as four separate cross sectional studies, one for 
each wave. The advantage of conducting four different studies is that it provides information 
about the robustness of the results. Unfortunately the cross-section analysis prevents the use 
of country dummies, as these would absorb all the differences in government spending across 
countries. However, this can be partially recovered by controlling for a number of personal 
characteristics, which are likely to be influenced by the country in which individuals live.  
The first set of regressions analyses the first wave of the EVS, which contains data for 
the years 1981 and 1982. Four types of analysis are developed: (1) a basic OLS regression; 
and, given that the dependent variable is binary, (2) a Probit; (3) Logit; and (4) robust Probit 
analyses are appropriate. Table 8 contains the results. 
  
  [Table 8 here] 
 
The analysis is repeated for the second wave of the EVS, which contains data for the 
years 1990 and 1991. In this case it is possible to introduce a variable for interest in politics. 
Results for the second wave are shown in table 9.  
 
[Table 9 here] 
 
The striking result is that the coefficient of the general government final consumption 
variable (Govcon) is positive and significant in all regressions. Also having children is 
positive and significant, as well as being male. As with the British data, income mostly 
affects volunteering in a negative way. Contrary to the BHPS, however, being married seems 
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to have a negative effect on the individual choice to volunteer, while religion does not seem 
to have a clear effect.  
For the third and fourth wave, data about general government expenditure, education, 
precise purchase power parity (PPP) income, and ideas about whether people should stick to 
their own affairs are available, allowing for a more comprehensive investigation. Table 9 
shows the results for the third wave.  
 
    [Table 9 here] 
 
The positive and significant effect of government expenditure is still present. Having 
children, higher education, being interested in politics, and believing that people should not 
stick to their own affairs also have positive and significant effects. Religion and marital status 
once more do not seem to influence volunteering in a clear and significant way. The same 
results are obtained for wave 4, as can be seen in Table 10. 
  
    [Table 10 here] 
 
In sum, the data are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model about the 
dependence of volunteering on the size of the welfare state, personal abilities, and 
employment. These findings support the view that, based on the available data for Europe and 
for the United Kingdom, government expenditure has a positive effect on volunteering: a 
decrease in public spending decreases the probability that employed agents decide to 
volunteer. 
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Narrative Analysis 
 
The econometric findings support the analytical model’s prediction that less public spending 
does not lead employed individuals to volunteer more. A narrative analysis can be useful to 
cast more light on the qualitative relationships between volunteering, public spending, 
abilities, and volunteering infrastructure. As part of a wider, independently conducted study, 
19 qualitative interviews were held between October and December 2009 in Glasgow (UK) 
with 7 active residents of the area Pollokshields Southside Central and 12 public 
professionals working for Glasgow City Council and various agencies delivering public 
services in this area.  
The goal of the research was to reveal the communicative patterns and tensions that 
prevented productive collaboration. The interviews were approached as narratives: stories 
people tell about their personal experiences which wittingly or unwittingly enable them to 
pinpoint what happened, make sense of these happenings, and express their normative 
evaluation (Hummel 1991; Wagenaar 2011, 208-222). These stories are structured according 
to narrative elements such as plotlines, characters, frames, and metaphors (Rein and Schön 
1994; Stone 2002). By analyzing how different actors structured their narratives, the analysis 
teased out “the work narratives do” (Forester 1993) in harboring underlying beliefs, feelings, 
and experiences, as well as broader behavioral patterns and tensions. The narratives of the 
respondents were analyzed through a grounded theory process: by systematically coding the 
transcribed interviews and writing memos in which codes and stories were interpreted and 
compared to each other, it was possible to formulate a meta-narrative of the entire case 
(Charmaz 2006; Wagenaar 2011, 251-272). 
This meta-narrative of Glasgow tells the story of public spending and volunteering 
levels traditionally above UK average, while levels of poverty and deprivation are unmatched 
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by any other major British city. This unproductive pattern is rooted in Glasgow’s 
development into a “dual city” (Keating 1988): far-reaching governmental intervention and 
centralism led to successful regeneration programs in inner-city areas, but simultaneously 
fuelled deep-seated community activism and distrust in economically, socially, and politically 
marginalized peripheral estates. Citizens tend to be active in volunteering and dislike being 
told what to do, while Glasgow City Council tends to support volunteering and like being in 
control of what happens. In this context, the research identified two opposing narratives 
which divided the respondents more or less in half: one group (respondents 1-4,9,10,12,16-
18) told stories in which public spending is seen as vital support for volunteering, while the 
stories of the other group (respondents 5-8,11,13-15,19) portrays it as a source of hampering 
and patronizing interference from local authorities.  
The first narrative, “work in progress”, characterizes volunteering as an ongoing, 
complex, and demanding process in constant need of professional support. It was 
communicated by public professionals responsible for this. Their experiences varied 
according to their specializations, remit, and organizations: e.g., a local police officer told 
stories about the complex and changeable composition and needs of the neighborhood in 
terms of safety, while a City Council official talked about imprecise and ambiguous policies 
and regular revisions of rules and structures. John, an educated public professional in his 
forties working for the local authorities to encourage volunteering, had most experience with 
this: 
 
...part of the process is ... taking the message ... to ... community councils, ... area 
committees, ... tenants and residents associations, youth groups... Basically if you 
identify where they are, and who they are, then making contact with them, going 
along and making a presentation... And you might go to ten of those, you know, and 
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for every ten you might get one ... who is willing to come along, and they might just 
come along to a meeting, decide it’s not for them and then disappear again. But that’s 
again what I say about the nature of it and it’s about continuing to go out and 
spread the word and networking with partners to make sure that ... they’re spreading 
the word... So, but it’s just an ongoing piece of work ... that doesn’t stop... So very 
much work in progress... 
 
John tells about the great effort involved with his daily work of supporting volunteering. His 
story turns from description to prescription with a “normative leap” (Rein and Schön 1994, 
26): first describing his work as fairly ordered and manageable (“identify where they are, and 
who they are, then making contact with them, going along and making a presentation”), John 
ends by prescribing that “it’s just an ongoing piece of work ... that doesn’t stop” that asks for 
“continuing to go out and spread the word”. The normative leap that the “work in progress” is 
“the nature of it” legitimizes the view that volunteering is inherently an endless process of 
recruiting and sustaining volunteers in continuous need of public spending to guarantee a 
volunteering infrastructure. There is a permanent need for skilled professionals who go out to 
meet new people, convince them to come along, provide them with adequate training, and 
keep them on board. 
The second narrative, “making a difference”, holds that citizens are motivated to 
volunteer and solve community problems, but are prevented by local authority interference in 
actually making a difference. It was expressed by citizens and a few disillusioned public 
professionals. In different ways, they had been taking an adversarial stance to the local 
authorities: e.g., one pensioner told stories about his community centre being cut off from 
funding while a young mother talked about not being taking seriously in meetings. Jenny, a 
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low-educated, employed, middle-aged woman active in a number of voluntary organizations, 
takes perhaps the fiercest stance of all: 
 
…if it’s local people run you’ve got what local people are looking for. If you as a 
funder want to come in and actually do more, you … can’t come in with this 
approach ... ‘We’ll set up our own structures’, which [the Council] has been 
doing... I live in one of the worst areas for health ... and our health initiatives have 
been paid back to the bone. Our local health projects that drew a lot, smoking 
cessation groups, you know, weight loss things, you know, confidence boosting to get 
you out of depression therapies, you know, alternative therapies for residents... The 
only way to really fix Glasgow is by using the communities. And to get some kind 
of health employer coming in and saying ‘We should be doing that’..., Glasgow folk 
turn away and say ‘On your way’. ... People will come into a health club ... locally... 
That’s where a big Glasgow strategy should be feeding into... They should be 
saying ‘What is it that you’re doing that got the results and how can we help you get 
more results?’. 
 
Jenny strongly resents City Council interference with voluntary activities. Her narrative 
follows a storyline of “stymied progress”: “In the beginning ... things got better, thanks to a 
certain someone [or something]. But now somebody or something is interfering with our 
hero, so things are going to get terrible again” (Stone 2002, 139, 142). At first, Jenny found 
herself living “in one of the worst areas for health” (setting) and got involved in “local health 
projects that drew a lot” of participants and made a difference. However, “our health 
initiatives” (the hero) were “paid back to the bone” while City Council and a “health 
employer” (anti-heroes) tried to take over and “set up [their] own structures” (climax). This 
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story legitimizes her view that volunteers have the right abilities for making a difference and 
“the only way to really fix Glasgow” is by supporting them to do so without any government 
interference.  
 At first glance, there seems to be an impasse between these opposing narratives: the 
belief that volunteering benefits from more public spending underlying John’s story is in 
fundamental conflict with Jenny’s underlying belief that it benefits from less public spending. 
However, working out a pragmatic compromise is possible despite deep-seated differences 
(Forester 1999). John and Jenny should recognize that volunteering is an ongoing, messy, and 
frustrating type of work, that their stories are partial constructions of the complex nature of 
volunteering, and that they both offer valuable and complementary views. Volunteering could 
be less of a “work in progress” for John if he would recognize and accommodate the abilities 
of citizens more, while Jenny could be more effective in “making a difference” when 
recognizing the value of public professionals’ volunteering infrastructure. This, admittedly 
brief and preliminary, illustration of the complex micro level activities of voluntary practice 
suggests that public spending can make volunteering more successful when local authorities 
and volunteers nurture a collaborative relationship to work out practical agreements on how 
abilities and volunteering infrastructure can reinforce each other. 
 Thus, the narrative analysis suggests that public spending will stimulate volunteering 
if employed individuals consider it worth their time. They are less likely to volunteer if they 
perceive their abilities for “making a difference” as low and the volunteering infrastructure as 
inadequate for dealing with the “work in progress”. Public spending in itself does not seem 
sufficient to increase volunteering: also productive collaborative relationships between local 
authorities and volunteers are needed. Less public spending, then, increases the probability 
that collaborative relationships are offset, abilities and volunteering infrastructure are 
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insufficiently supported, and employed individuals will consider voluntary work as not worth 
allocating their time to. 
 
Rethinking the Government-Volunteering Relationship 
 
The goal of this paper was to examine the theoretical and practical consistency of the perhaps 
too optimistic expectations of the Big Society plan about volunteering after withdrawing 
public spending. Many factors were already known to affect levels of voluntary activity, but 
surprisingly enough the relationship between public spending and volunteering had great 
lacunae, which were filled by a widely held belief in the existence of a crowding out effect. 
The analysis here shows that more government expenditure actually increases the probability 
of volunteering for employed agents.  This finding should not be interpreted as (political) 
argument in favor of “Big Government” and against “Big Society”. Rather, the analysis 
suggests that government expenditure has to be tailored to sustaining local abilities and 
volunteering infrastructure so that employed individuals will consider voluntary work as 
worth allocating their time to. 
Although the British context greatly differs from the American one, this conclusion 
resembles the recommendations for volunteering policy that Nessbit and Brudney (2010) 
reach in their analysis of the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act, and supplements these 
in two ways. First, public spending is necessary for dealing with the inherent challenges of 
voluntary work and keeping the level of volunteering from going down. Second, public 
spending should be used to accommodate and improve individual abilities and volunteering 
infrastructure. This is not to refute the argument that the relationship of governments with 
voluntary organizations and volunteering is inherently problematic and contentious, nor that 
voluntary organizations can generate negative consequences (Brecher and Wise 2008; 
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Reingold and Lenkowsky 2010). Indeed, the analysis confirmed that public spending and 
volunteering are wedged between bold political ideals and unruly practice. At the same time, 
the analysis showed that unilaterally “rolling back” (or “rolling in”) government is not the 
way to deal with the inherent difficulties of volunteering. Rather, the only sustainable 
approach to volunteering seems to be localized partnership working that makes volunteers 
feel that their voluntary work is worth their time.  
The analysis suggests that volunteering is not simply a function of the presence or 
withdrawing of government; it requires government that places itself next to voluntary 
workers and organizations to work out pragmatic ways for making a difference. Government 
expenditure should not merely form a regulatory instrument for oversight and control of 
voluntary organizations (cf. LeRoux 2009). This leads to the following recommendations: (1) 
public spending needs to be used to prevent volunteering levels from dropping; (2) employed 
individuals have to be encouraged to do voluntary work by making it worth their time; and 
(3) for public spending to increase volunteering, governments and voluntary organizations 
should cultivate local abilities and volunteering infrastructure based on collaborative 
relationships. These recommendations, drawn from the macro and micro level analysis 
conducted here, complement recent middle level analyses of the relationship between 
government and voluntary organizations, which assert that financial support of nonprofits, 
training and education of their professionals, and building a solid volunteering infrastructure 
are vital to successful volunteering (Smith 2008; Shea 2011).  
Admittedly, the analysis here provides a preliminary basis to speculate about the 
relationship between government expenditure and volunteering and the prospective effects of 
the Big Society plan. But this test of the main belief underlying this policy may provide some 
valuable insights into the likelihood of its success or failure, as well as helpful 
recommendations about the direction in which it could be amended. Future research could 
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refine the conclusions and recommendations reached here by further analyzing the ways 
government expenditure interacts with abilities and volunteering infrastructure; the influence 
of specific fiscal elements on relative segments of volunteering; and the role of money 
donation. In any case, future research and policy should advance a thorough understanding of 
the relationship between public spending and volunteering. 
 
Footnotes 
 
[1] Years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 are excluded as these do not contain 
information on the variable used. 
[2] All the Stata codes used in the estimations are available from the authors upon request. 
[3] Organizations for the BHPS are listed in table 2, while organizations for the EVS are 
listed in table 6. 
[4] Countries are listed in table 6.    
 
Appendix 
A. The Economy and the Utility Function 
 
Society is populated by successive generations t of agents, with each agent indexed by 
 ∈ 0,1, and the total mass of individuals normalized to 1. The population does not change 
over time and there is only one active individual per family. Agents live for one period and 
they are characterized by a certain degree of inner abilities 	
  0 and capital inherited from 
the parent 	
  0. Each individual allocates her working hours, 	
, between voluntary 
work 	
 and market work 	
. 
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The utility function depends on private end-of-life consumption 	
 and bequest 	
, 
volunteering 	
2, public good 
, and disutility of work 	
: 
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 where parameters satisfy 0<α<1, 0 <e<  1 , 0<δ<1, and 0<ψ<1. Hence, this model features 
both intragenerational altruism, expressed through by the volunteering motive, and 
intergenerational altruism, expressed by the bequest motive. 
 
B. The Constraints 
 
Labor supplied in the market, private capital, and productive abilities serve to produce the 
aggregate good in the economy: 
ββ −
−
=
1
1iptiptitit khAX  
where 0<β<1. The after-tax end of life wealth is given by: 
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Since ititit Wkc =+ , the indirect utility function can be rewritten as 
2
2
ite
t
e
itit
HGWu ψδ −+=
 
26 
 
(2) 
 
Each person’s volunteering impact depends on the hours spent volunteering, her productive 
abilities, and the aggregate volunteering capital 	
: 
ββ −
−
=
1
1vtivtitit khAV  
     
The volunteering capital evolves according to: 
 
θρ +djAh+k)-(1=k jtvjt1-vtvt ∫  
(3) 
In which ρ represents the natural decay rate of the volunteering capital lost across 
generations. A certain degree of volunteering capital θ is independent from volunteering as it 
is guaranteed from market interactions. That is, even if initial volunteering capital were zero, 
the market would still harbor a minimum possibility for voluntary activity to emerge. Even in 
the extreme case in which any history of volunteering or social relationships was absent, 
agents could make volunteering arise from the very basic social contact involved in market 
activities.  
The public good can be provided either using government revenues or volunteering: 
∫∫
−
−
−
−
+= djhAkdjkhAG jvtjtvtjptjptjttt
ββββτ 1 1
1
1   
Assuming that the abilities are stationary, in steady state each agent’s capital would 
converge to: 
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C. Optimal Time Allocation 
 
To find the optimal allocation of time between working and volunteering, the first order 
conditions and some simple passages are followed: the first order conditions of the 
maximization of (1) are: 
[ ]
0
)()1(
)()1(
11
1
11
1
1
=
+−−=
+−−=
∂
∂
−−
−
−−
−
−
iptivt
e
ipt
e
iptitt
iptivtiptiptitt
e
p
ip
it
hhhkAe
hhhkAWe
h
u
ψτβ
ψτβ
ββ
ββ
 
(4)     
and 
 
[ ]
0
)(
)(
11
1
11
1
1
=
+−=
+−=
∂
∂
−−
−
−−
−
−
iptivt
e
ivt
e
ivtit
iptivtivtivtit
e
it
iv
it
hhhkAe
hhhkAVe
h
u
ψβ
ψβ
ββ
ββ
 
(5) 
 
from which is obtained: 
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Substituting (6) into (5) yields: 
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which imply that the equilibrium market working hours are: 
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Higher inner ability itA  makes agent j more willing to both work in the market and 
volunteer. A change in abilities always changes each agent’s optimal time allocation to the 
same proportion no matter the personal ratio of private capital to volunteering capital. 
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Also taxation influences the decision of timing allocation between volunteering and 
working in the market. In particular: 
Proposition 1. An increase (decrease) in tτ  brings about an increase (decrease) in the 
optimal volunteering hours *ivth and a decrease (increase) in the optimal working hours *ipth  for 
each agent i∈[0,1]. 
B. Proof of Proposition 1: The first derivative of *ivth with respect to the tax rate is: 
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The first derivative of *ipth with respect to tτ  is: 
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which is negative since: 
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QED. 
 
 
Proposition 2. If 
e
e
t
t β
τ
τ −≤
−
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1
a decrease (increase) in taxation causes a net decrease 
(increase) in public good provision in both the government and voluntary component. 
C. Proof of Proposition 2: It is necessary to prove that if conditions in the Proposition 2 
hold, than the public good tG increases in both factors ∫
−
−
djkhA jptjptjtt ββτ 1 1 and ∫−− djhAk jvtjtvt
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as tτ
 
increases. From Proposition 1 is known that an increase in tτ will cause an increase in 
*
ivth .  It is necessary to find the condition under which an increase in tτ  brings an increase in 
the optimal amount of government revenues. The elasticity of the optimal work supply to the 
taxation is: 
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If 
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the work supply is inelastic. An increase (decrease) in tτ translates into a net increase of the 
public good supply also in the government part of the public good. QED. 
 
D. Non-active Agents 
Let us generalize this framework by assuming that there are two different types of abilities in 
the model: iptA  for the production of the good itX and ivtA for the provision of volunteering. 
In this case: 
Proposition 3 If agents have zero productive ability and positive volunteering ability, 
i.e. 0=iptA , while 0>ivtA , then their decision about volunteering does not depend on taxes.  
         Proof of Proposition 3: Non-productive agent j can be viewed as characterised by a 
negative shock on the productive abilities, so that 0=iptA ,  while 0>ivtA . In this case, her 
indirect utility function then becomes: 
 
2
2
ite
t
e
itit
HGVu ψδ −+=
 
 
The optimal private work is 0* =ipth  . The FOC relative to the hours spent 
volunteering are: 
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In this case the optimal amount of hours spent volunteering does not depend on tax 
rates: 
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 Variables BHPS 
Variable Definition Code 
Vol Being active in organizations  1=  
0= 
Yes     
No 
Exp Ratio between general government expenditure 
and GDP 
Numerical 
Nchild Number of children Numerical 
Sex Sex of the respondent 1= 
2= 
Male 
Female 
Edu Highest achieved education 0= 
 
 
1= 
2= 
3=  
 
 
4= 
5= 
Commercial Qualification 
CSE Grade 2-5,Scot G     
Apprenticeship 
Higher Degree 
First Degree 
Teaching Qualification 
Other Higher Qualification 
Nursing Qualification 
GCE A Level Qualification 
GCE O Level or Equi 
Sex Sex of the respondent 1= 
2= 
Male 
Female 
Married Being married  1= 
0= 
Yes 
No 
Income Annual labour Income Numerical 
Neigh Like present neighbourhood  1= 
0= 
Yes 
No 
Religion Religious denomination of the respondent 1= 
2= 
3= 
4= 
5= 
6= 
7= 
8= 
9= 
10= 
11= 
12= 
13= 
14= 
No Religion 
Church of England /Anglican 
Roman Catholic  
Presbyterian /Church of Scotland                 
Methodist                        
Baptist 
Congregation/URC                 
Other Christian                  
Christian 
Muslim/Islam                    
Hindu 
Jewish  
Sikh 
Other 
Country Country 1= 
2= 
3= 
4= 
England 
Scotland 
Wales 
Northern Ireland 
Vote Level of interest in politics 1= 
2= 
3= 
4= 
Very interested                 
Fairly interested  
Not very interested                 
Not at all interested                  
Expcou Ratio country general specific government 
expenditure and GDP 
Numerical 
Table 1: Variables BHPS 
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Variables Summary British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
Vol Being active in organizations  .485 .500 
Exp Ratio between general government expenditure and GDP .425 .020 
Nchild Number of children .673 .976 
Sex Sex of the respondent 1.485 .500 
Edu Highest achieved education 3.139 1.442 
Married Being married  .582 .493 
Income Annual labour Income 16168.64 14911.34 
Neigh Like present neighbourhood  .981 .258 
Religion Religious denomination of the respondent 3.584 3.347 
Country Country 1.683 1.019 
Vote Level of interest in politics 2.755 .904 
Expcou Ratio country general specific government expenditure and 
GDP 
.308 .037 
Table 2.  Variables Summary BHPS 
Asterisks indicate coefficient significant at 5%. The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimates.     
 Organizations include: political party, trade union, environmental group, parents association, tenants group, religious group, 
voluntary group, other community group, social group, sports club, women institute, women group, other organisation.       
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BHPS OLS  for Total Expenditure and Country Specific Expenditure 
Var OLS -Tot OLS- Coun Var OLS –Tot OLS- Coun 
Exp  .638*    
(.135)      
       - Religion6 .125*    
(.052)      
.140*    
(.052)      
Expcou        - .346*    
(.136)      
Religion7 .311*    
(.053)      
.312*    
(.053)      
Country2        - -.018    
(.013)     
Religion8  .124*   
(.011)     
.149*    
(.013)     
Country3       - -.048*   
(.012)     
Religion9 .147*    
(.013)     
.145*    
(.013)     
Country4       - -.077*   
(.019)     
Religion10 .100*    
(.035) 
.099*    
(.035)      
Nchild   022*   
(.003)     
.022*      
(.003)     
Religion11 .028   
(.067)      
.024     
(.068)      
Edu1 .177*    
(.021)      
.180*    
(.021)      
Religion12 .207*    
(.057)      
.205*    
(.058)      
Edu2 .144*    
(.014)     
.145*    
(.014)     
Religion13  .090   
(.071)      
.082*    
(.072)      
Edu3 .079*    
(.012)      
.078*    
(.012)      
Religion14  .142*     
(.023)     
 .144*   
(.024)      
Edu4 .052*    
(.014)      
.052*    
(.014)      
Sex  -.055*  
(.007)    
-.056*   
(.007)     
Edu5 .045*    
(.013)      
.0458*  
(.013)      
Married .019*    
(.007)      
.019*    
(.007)      
Religion2 .067*    
(.009)      
.062*    
(.009)      
Income -3e-07*        
(1e-07)     
-3e-07*        
(1e-07)     
Religion3 .080*    
(.011)      
.091*    
(.012)      
Neigh    .020*   
(.010)      
.020*    
(.010)      
Religion4      -      - Vote -.043*   
(.003)    
-.043*   
(.003) 
Religion5 .177*    
(.023)           
.177*    
(.023)      
Const .238*    
(.062)      
.421*     
(.044)      
Table 3.  OLS BHPS 
Asterisks indicate coefficient significant at 5%. The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimates.     
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British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) – Volunteering (General Government 
Expenditure) 
Var Xtreg 
(Fe) 
Xtreg 
(Re) 
Xtrega
r (Fe) 
Xtrega
r (Re) 
Logit Probit Xtlogit 
Pooled 
Xtlogit
(Fe) 
Xtlogit
(Re) 
Xtprobit 
(Fe) 
Exp .416* 
(.146) 
.627* 
(.132) 
.875* 
(.134)   
.137 
(.150) 
4.09*    
(.582) 
2.54* 
(.367) 
2.596* 
(.542)    
2.543*   
(.853) 
3.928*   
(.778) 
2.297*   
(.457) 
Nchild .032* 
(.005)  
.022* 
(.003) 
.009   
(.007) 
.014*   
(.003) 
.075*     
(.014) 
.047*   
(.009) 
.090* 
(.013) 
.195* 
.023 
  .136* 
(.017) 
.080* 
(.010) 
Edu1 -.015 
(.053) 
.186* 
(.020) 
.214*   
(.073) 
  .220* 
(.021) 
.866* 
(.094) 
.539*   
(.057) 
.773*    
(.085) 
-.062 
.275 
1.177* 
(.120) 
.692* 
(.070) 
Edu2 -.022 
(.041) 
.148* 
(.014) 
.201*   
(.056) 
  .171*   
(.015) 
.681*   
(.063) 
.424*    
(.039) 
.610*   
(.057) 
-.094 
(.200) 
  .923* 
(.083) 
.543*   
(.048) 
Edu3 -.003 
(.030) 
.087* 
(.012) 
.107* 
(.041) 
.113* 
(.013) 
.488*   
(.055) 
.304* 
(.034) 
.361* 
(.050)   
-.003 
(.146) 
.548* 
(.071) 
.322*   
(.042) 
Edu4 .006 
(.033) 
.058*   
(.013) 
.091   
(.047) 
.068* 
(.014) 
.293*    
(.061)   
.182* 
(.038) 
.244* 
(.055) 
.057   
(.164) 
.370* 
(.079) 
.217*   
(.046) 
Edu5 .040 
(.032) 
.048* 
(.012) 
.098* 
(.045) 
.054*   
(.013) 
.217*   
(.057) 
  .135*   
(.035) 
.200* 
(.052) 
.244 
(.162) 
  .305* 
(.075) 
  .180*   
(.044) 
Married -.027* 
(.011) 
.035* 
(.006) 
-.003   
(.014) 
.047*  
(.007) 
.201*   
(.029) 
.126*   
(.018) 
.145* 
(.026) 
-.161*   
(.054) 
  .215*    
(.036) 
.127* 
(.021) 
Income -6e-07*   
(2.e-07) 
-6e-08   
(1e-07) 
-3e-07   
(2.e-07) 
1e-07   
(1e-07) 
2e-06*  
(1e-06) 
  1e-06*   
(5e-07) 
-2.e-07   
6.e-07 
-5e-06*   
(1e-06) 
-4e-07   
(9e-07) 
 -2e-07  
(5e-07) 
Neigh   .002   
(.011) 
.021*   
(.009) 
.012 
(.013) 
.021* 
(.009) 
.172*    
(.046) 
.107*   
(.028) 
-2e-07*  
(6e-07) 
.014 
(.067) 
.132* 
(.057) 
.077* 
(.033) 
Vote -.016* 
(.005) 
-.049*   
(.003) 
-.011 *  
(.005) 
-.042* 
(.003) 
 -.238*   
(.015) 
-.148*   
(.009) 
-.200* 
(.013) 
-.097* 
(.027) 
-.301*   
(.019) 
-.177*   
(.011) 
Const   .364* 
(.071) 
 .219*   
(.059) 
.027* 
(.012) 
.391* 
(.067) 
-1.87*   
(.264) 
-1.16*   
(.164) 
-1.17*   
(.244) 
 - -1.760* 
(.355) 
-1.03*   
(.208) 
Table 4. Regressions BHPS –General Government Expenditure 
Asterisks indicate coefficient significant at 5%. The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimates.     
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British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) – Volunteering (Country Government 
Expenditure) 
Table 5. Regressions BHPS - Country Government Expenditure 
Asterisks indicate coefficient significant at 5%. The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimates.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Var Xtreg 
(fe) 
Xtreg 
(re) 
Xtregar 
(fe) 
Xtregar 
(re) 
Logit probit Xtlogit 
pooled 
Xtlogit 
(fe) 
Xtlogit(
re) 
Xtprobi
t (fe) 
Expcou .487* 
(.144) 
.351*   
(.134) 
1.216*   
(.192) 
.070   
(.150) 
1.698* 
(.575) 
1.060* 
(.358) 
1.448* 
(.549) 
3.002* 
(.873) 
2.181* 
(.811) 
1.276* 
(.476) 
Country2 -.039     
(.068) 
-.022   
(.013) 
-.136   
(.064) 
-.007   
(.014) 
-.119* 
(.055) 
-.074* 
(.034) 
-.092 
(.053) 
-.217 
(.241) 
-.145 
(.078) 
-.085 
(.046) 
Country3 .128* 
(.058) 
-.029*   
(.011) 
.061   
(.060) 
-.021   
(.012) 
-.152* 
(.046) 
-.095* 
(.029) 
-.121* 
(.044) 
.663 
(.290) 
-.191 
(.066) 
-.113* 
(.039) 
Country4 .936*   
(.016) 
-.016   
(.016) 
.762   
(.654) 
.011   
(.018) 
-.139* 
(.070) 
-.087* 
(.044) 
-.066 
(.067) 
12.22* 
(546.77) 
-.104* 
(.100) 
-.062 
(.059) 
Nchild .032*   
(.005) 
.022*   
(.003) 
.009   
(.007) 
(.014)*   
(.003) 
.075* 
(.014) 
.046* 
(.009) 
.090* 
(.013) 
.195* 
(.023) 
.135* 
(.017) 
.079* 
(.010) 
Edu1 -.015   
(.053) 
.184*   
(.020) 
.239*   
(.072) 
.220*   
(.021) 
.860* 
(.094) 
.535* 
(.058) 
.765* 
(.085) 
-.074 
(.276) 
1.166* 
(.121) 
.687* 
(.071) 
Edu2 -.027 
(.041) 
.147*    
(.014) 
.230* 
(.054) 
.172*   
(.015) 
.677* 
(.063) 
.422* 
(.040) 
.605* 
(.058) 
-.130 
(.201) 
.917* 
(.083) 
.539* 
(.049) 
Edu3 -.008   
(.030) 
.086*   
(.012) 
.133*   
(.039) 
.114*   
(.013) 
.487* 
(.055) 
.303* 
(.034) 
.358* 
(.051) 
-.037 
(.147) 
.544* 
(.071) 
.320* 
(.042) 
Edu4 .000 
(.033) 
.057*   
(.013) 
.112* 
(.045) 
.068*   
(.014) 
.292* 
(.061) 
.181* 
(.038) 
.239* 
(.056) 
.023 
(.165) 
.363* 
(.079) 
.213* 
(.046) 
Edu5 .038   
(.032) 
.048*   
(.012) 
.129* 
(.043) 
.055*   
(.013) 
.219* 
(.057) 
.136* 
(.035) 
.200* 
(.052) 
.231 
(.162) 
.305* 
(.075) 
.180* 
(.044) 
Married -.028*     
(.011) 
.034*   
(.006) 
-.003   
(.014) 
.046*   
(.007) 
.201* 
(.029) 
.125* 
(.018) 
.140* 
(.026) 
-.170* 
(.055) 
.208* 
(.036) 
.123* 
(.021) 
Income -7e-07*   
(2e-07) 
-1e-07   
(1e-07) 
-3.e-07   
(2.e-07) 
1e-07   
(1e-07) 
1e-06 
(1e-06) 
.1e-06 
(5e-07) 
-4e-07   
(6e-07) 
-5e-06*   
(1e-06) 
-8e-07  
9e-07 
-4e-07   
(5e-07) 
Neigh .002   
(.012) 
.020*   
(.009) 
.015 
(.013) 
.021*   
(.009) 
1e-06*    
(1e-06) 
.103* 
(.028) 
.084* 
(.039) 
.013 
(.068) 
.124* 
(.057) 
.072* 
(.033) 
Vote -.016*   
(.005) 
-.049*   
(.003) 
-.011   
(.005) 
-.042*   
(.003) 
-.241* 
(.015) 
-.150* 
(.009) 
-.203* 
(.013) 
-.097* 
(.027) 
-.307* 
(.019) 
-.180* 
(.011) 
Const .307* 
(.054) 
.394*    
(.042) 
-.084*   
(.022) 
.433*   
(.046) 
-.561* 
(.182) 
-.348* 
(.113) 
-.440* 
(.172) 
3.002* 
(.873) 
-.655* 
(.255) 
-.382* 
(.150) 
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Variables EVS 
Variable Definition Code 
Vol Doing unpaid work for organizations:  1= 
2= 
Yes 
No 
Exp Ratio government expenditure and GDP Numerical 
Govcon General government final consumption as % of 
GDP 
Numerical 
Sex Sex of the respondent 1= 
2= 
Male 
Female 
Edu Highest achieved education 1= 
2= 
3= 
 
4= 
 
5= 
 
6= 
 
7= 
 
8= 
Incomplete elementary education 
Completed (compulsory) elementary 
education 
Incomplete secondary school: 
technical/vocational type 
 Complete secondary school: 
technical/vocational type/secondary 
Incomplete secondary: university-
preparatory type/secondary, 
Complete secondary: university-preparatory 
type/full secondary 
 Some university without degree/higher 
education - lower-level tertiary 
University with degree/higher education - 
upper-level tertiary 
Married Being married 1= 
2= 
Yes 
No 
Income Monthly household income (x1000) Numerical 
Incomecat Monthly household income categories 1= 
2= 
3= 
4= 
5= 
6= 
7= 
8= 
9= 
10= 
Lower step 
Second step 
Third step 
Fourth step 
Fifth step 
Sixth step 
Seventh step 
Eight step 
Ninth step 
Tenth step 
Vote Level of interested in politics 1= 
2= 
3= 
4= 
Very interested 
Somewhat interested 
Not very interested 
Not at all interested 
Religion Religious denomination of the respondent 1= 
2= 
3= 
4= 
5= 
6= 
7= 
8= 
9= 
Buddhist 
Free church/non denominational church 
Hindu 
Jew 
Muslim 
Orthodox 
Other 
Protestant 
Roman catholic 
Religion1 Belonging to any religious denomination 1= 
0= 
Yes 
No 
People People should stick to their own affairs  1= 
2= 
3= 
4= 
5= 
Agree strongly 
Agree 
Not agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Disagree strongly 
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Table 6. Variables EVS 
 Countries are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Great Britain, and USA   Organizations include: welfare organizations, religious organisation, cultural 
activities, trade unions, political parties/groups, local community action, third world development/human rights, 
environment, ecology, animal rights, environment, animal rights, professional associations, youth work, sports/recreation, 
women groups, peace movement, voluntary health organisations, consumer groups, other groups. 
 
 
 
 
Variables Summary EVS  
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
Vol Doing unpaid work for organizations:  .331 .470 
Exp Ratio government expenditure and GDP .486 .106 
Govcon General government final consumption as % of GDP 19.502 4.885 
Nchild Number of children 1.424 1.314 
Sex Sex of the respondent 1.455 .498 
Edu Highest achieved education 5.144 1.918 
Married Being married .642 .480 
Income Monthly household income (x1000) 1.843 1.402 
Incomecat Monthly household income categories 5.849 2.392 
Vote Level of interested in politics 2.534 .923 
Religion Religious denomination of the respondent 61.178 6.730 
Religion1 Belonging to any religious denomination .711 .453 
People People should stick to their own affairs  2.741 1.183 
Table 7. Variables Summary EVS  
Asterisks indicate coefficient significant at 5%. The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimates.     
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EVS Wave 1- 1981 
Variable OLS Probit Logit Probit 
Robust 
Govcon .006*   
(.001) 
.025*  
(.005) 
.027* 
(.003) 
.002*  
(.002) 
Nchild .027*   
(.004) 
.045*  
(.011) 
.124* 
(.020) 
.076*  
(.012) 
Sex -.002  
(.012) 
-.089    
(.026) 
-.011 
(.057) 
-.007  
(.035) 
Married -.026    
(.015) 
-.037   
(.034) 
-.117 
(.069) 
-.073  
(.042) 
Incomecat2 -.136*   
(.068) 
.072   
(.091) 
-.572 
(.308) 
-.355   
(.188) 
Incomecat 3 .181*   
(.059) 
.030*    
(.083) 
-.794* 
(.266) 
-.485* 
(.163) 
Incomecat4 -.165*   
(.055) 
.084*   
(.081) 
-.719* 
(.249) 
-.443* 
(.152) 
Incomecat5 -.127*    
(.054) 
.088*   
(.081) 
-.530* 
(.242) 
-.330* 
(.148) 
Incomecat6 -.132*  
(.054) 
.165*   
(.082) 
-.552* 
(.238) 
-.340* 
(.146) 
Incomecat7 -.132*   
(.053) 
.179*   
(.084) 
-.554* 
(.237) 
-.341* 
(.145) 
Incomecat8 -.120*   
(.053) 
.105*   
(.086) 
-.497* 
(.236) 
-.307* 
(.145) 
Incomecat9 -.103   
(.054) 
.215   
(.089) 
-.411 
(.241) 
-.257  
(.147) 
Incomecat10 -.057  
(.055) 
.126  
(.086) 
-.210 
(.244) 
-.132  
(.150) 
Religion1 .054   
(.154) 
.038    
(.425) 
.203 
(.724) 
.117   
(.448) 
Religion2 -.038 
(.208) 
-.671   
(.570) 
-.186 
(.953 ) 
-.126  
(.584) 
Religion3 -.232   
(.199) 
-.013   
(.474) 
-1.235     
(-1.043) 
-.717  
(.620) 
Religion4 -.297 
(.208) 
-1.074  
(.509) 
-1.800     
(-1.264) 
-1.003 
(.709) 
Religion5 - - - - 
Religion6 .058   
(.153) 
-.278  
(.465) 
0.235 
(.720) 
.137   
(.446) 
Religion7 .008   
(.147) 
.156   
(.430) 
0.020 
(.696) 
.004   
(.431) 
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Asterisks indicate coefficient significant at 5%. The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimates.     
 
 
 
 
Table 8. EVS Wave 1 Regressions 
 
 
 
EVS Wave 2 -1990 
         Variable OLS Probit Logit Probit 
Robust 
Govcon .008* 
(.002) 
0.025* 
(.005) 
.040* 
(.009) 
.025* 
(.005) 
Nchild .016* 
(.004) 
0.045* 
(.011) 
.074* 
(.017) 
.045* 
(.011) 
Sex -.0317* 
(.0092) 
-0.089* 
(.026) 
-.145* 
(.043) 
-.089* 
(.026) 
Married -.013  
(.012) 
-0.037 
(.034) 
-.059 
(.056) 
-.037 
(.034) 
Income2 .023 
(.031) 
0.072 
(.091) 
.113 
(.152) 
.072 
(.091) 
Income3 .009 
(.028) 
0.030 
(.083) 
.050 
(.139) 
.030 
(.083) 
Income4 .028 
(.0277) 
0.084 
(.081) 
.141 
(.135) 
.084 
(.081) 
Income5 .028 
(.028) 
0.088 
(.081) 
.144 
(.134) 
.088 
(.080) 
Income6 .056* 
(.028) 
0.165* 
(.082) 
.268* 
(.136) 
.165* 
(.081) 
Income7 .062* 
(.029) 
0.179* 
(.084) 
.292* 
(.140) 
.179* 
(.084) 
Income8 .0356 
(.0295) 
0.105 
(.086) 
.174 
(.143) 
.105 
(.085) 
Income9 .075* 
(.031) 
0.215* 
(.089) 
.349* 
(.147) 
.215* 
(.089) 
Income10 .044 
(.030) 
0.126 
(.086) 
.209 
(.142) 
.126 
(.085) 
Religion1 .019 
(.156) 
0.038 
(.425) 
.067 
(.690) 
.038 
(.434) 
Religion2 -.239 
(.201) 
-0.671 
(.570) 
-1.158 
(.960) 
-.671 
(.595) 
Religion3 
.002 -0.013 -.021 -.013 
   
Religion8 -.131   
(.147) 
-.240   
(.422) 
-0.619 
(.696) 
-.384  
(.431) 
Const .405   
(.157) 
-.343   
(.422) 
-0.420 
(.734) 
-.249   
(.453) 
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(.173) (.474) (.768) (.482) 
Religion4 -.321 
(.173) 
-1.075 
(.509) 
-1.862* 
(.872) 
-1.075* 
(.521) 
Religion5 -.105 
(.169) 
-0.278 
(.465) 
-.460 
(.757) 
-.278 
(.475) 
Religion6 .062 
(.157) 
0.156 
(.431) 
.259 
(.699) 
.156 
(.439) 
Religion7 -.085 
(.155) 
-0.241 
(.422) 
-.385 
(.686) 
-.241 
(.431) 
Religion8 -.122 
(.154) 
-0.343 
(.422) 
-.553 
(.685) 
-.343 
(.431) 
Vote -.091* 
(.005) 
-0.260* 
(.015) 
-.432* 
(.024) 
-.260* 
(.015) 
Const   .505*   
(.1599) 
.006*   
(.439) 
.024*   
(.714) 
.006   
(.445) 
Table 9. EVS Wave 2 Regressions 
Asterisks indicate coefficient significant at 5%. The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimates.     
 
 
 
 
EVS Wave 3 - 1999 
Variable OLS Probit Logit Probit 
Robust 
Exp .424* 
(.157) 
1.280* 
(.455) 
2.078* 
(.750) 
1.280 
(.448) 
Nchild .033* 
(.007) 
.095* 
(.020) 
.157* 
(.033) 
.095 
(.020) 
Sex -.055* 
(.015) 
-.154* 
(.043) 
-.256* 
(.071) 
-.154 
(.043) 
Education2 .118* 
(.056) 
.454* 
(.193) 
.812* 
(.356) 
.454 
(.194) 
Education3 .160* 
(.056) 
.586* 
(.192) 
1.032* 
(.356) 
.586 
(.194) 
Education4  .205* 
(.057) 
.713* 
(.194) 
1.244* 
(.358) 
.713 
(.196) 
Education5 .161* 
(.057) 
.591* 
(.196) 
1.035* 
(.361) 
.591 
(.196) 
Education6 .235* 
(.057) 
.798* 
(.194) 
1.382* 
(.358) 
.798 
(.195) 
Education7 .239* 
(.058) 
.802* 
(.197) 
1.389* 
(.362) 
.802 
(.197) 
Education8 .281* 
(.058) 
.910* 
(.196) 
1.561* 
(.3607) 
.910 
(.197) 
Married .009 
(.018) 
.029 
(.053) 
.046 
(.087) 
.028 
(.053) 
Income .006 
(.007) 
.016 
(.021) 
.024 
(.034) 
.016 
(.021) 
Religion1 .154 
(.237) 
.462 
(.731) 
.704 
(1.201) 
.462 
(.653) 
Religion2 -.243 
(.399) - - - 
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Religion3 .145 
(.273) 
.459 
(.821) 
.697 
(1.349) 
.460 
(.761) 
Religion4 -.125 
(.245) 
-.450 
(.773) 
-.870 
(1.298) 
-.450 
(.702) 
Religion5 -.054 
(.253) 
-.11 4 
(.782) 
-.338 
(1.310) 
-.114 
(.729) 
Religion6 .233 
(.236) 
.687 
(.729) 
1.067 
(1.199) 
.687 
(.652) 
Religion7 .061 
(.231) 
.218 
(.717) 
.312 
(1.178) 
.218* 
(.638) 
Religion8 .057 
(.231) 
.211 
(.716) 
.296 
(1.177) 
.211* 
(.637) 
Vote -.058* 
(.009) 
-.166*   
(.025) 
-0.276* 
(0.041) 
-.166* 
(.025) 
People (.022)*   
.006 
.061*   
(.018) 
.101*   
.0298 
  .061* 
(.018) 
Const -.017*   
(.251) 
-1.652*   
(.778) 
-2.701*   
(1.289) 
-1.652* 
(.706) 
Table 10. EVS Wave 3 Regressions 
Asterisks indicate coefficient significant at 5%. The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimates.     
 
 
 
EVS Wave 4 -2008 
Variable OLS Probit Logit Probit 
Robust 
Exp .309* 
(.089) 
.864* 
(.252) 
1.418* 
(.417) 
.864* 
(.256) 
Nchild .019* 
(.005) 
.053* 
(.015) 
.088* 
(.024) 
.053* 
(.014) 
Sex -.053* 
(.012) 
-.152* 
(.034) 
-.246* 
(.055) 
-.152* 
(.033) 
Education2 -.002 
(.074) 
-.016 
(.226) 
-.050 
(.390) 
-.016 
(.228) 
Education3 .036 
(.072) 
.116 
(.219) 
.203 
(.377) 
.116 
(.221) 
Education4 .042 
(.072) 
.141 
(.220) 
.228 
(.379) 
.141 
(.222) 
Education5 .069 
(.071) 
.216 
(.218) 
.369 
(.375) 
.216 
(.220) 
Education6 .087 
(.071) 
.265 
(.217) 
.449 
(.374) 
.265 
(.219) 
Education7 .148* 
(.072) 
.433* 
(.218) 
.720  
(.375) 
.433* 
(.220) 
Education8 .132 
(.073) 
.385 
(.221) 
.638 
(.379) 
.385 
(.222) 
Married .029* 
(.014) 
.080* 
(.039) 
.141* 
(.064) 
.080* 
(.039) 
Income .014* 
(.004) 
.039* 
(.011) 
.062* 
(.019) 
.039 
(.011) 
Religion1 .255* 
(.126) 
.707* 
(.353) 
1.125 
(.585) 
.707 
(.367) 
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Religion2 .189 
(.171) 
.505 
(.472) 
.827 
(.780) 
.505 
(.499) 
Religion3 .149 
(.175) 
.395 
(.489) 
.620 
(.800) 
.395 
(.496) 
Religion4 -.177 
(.125) 
-.525 
(.354) 
-.934 
(.592) 
-.525 
(.371) 
Religion5 -.195 
(.121) 
-.593 
(.338) 
-1.022 
(.560) 
-.593 
(.354) 
Religion6 .070 
(.123) 
.203 
(.344) 
.325 
(.569) 
.203 
(.359) 
Religion7 -.018 
(.119) 
-.037 
(.333) 
-.073 
(.551) 
-.037 
(.349) 
Religion8 -.024 
(.119) 
-.052   
(.332) 
-.093 
(.550) 
-.052 
(.348) 
Vote -.063 
(.007) 
-.181*   
(.019) 
-.302* 
(.032) 
-.181* 
(.019) 
People -1.652*   
(.778) 
.048*   
(.014) 
.082*   
(.024) 
.048* 
(.014) 
Const .274    
(.146) 
-.625    
(.416) 
-1.02   
(.696) 
-.625 
(.430) 
Table 11. EVS Wave 4 Regressions 
Asterisks indicate coefficient significant at 5%. The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimates.     
  
 
 
